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Introduction 
 
In the course of the last quarter of the 20th century corruption became not only 
a social, but also a political issue both on the international and domestic levels. 
Politically this has entailed international organisations addressing the subject 
to ensure that conventions or international treaties can be ratified. Domesti-
cally, it has entailed that even endemically corrupt countries have found it 
difficult to stay out of campaigns against corruption. This situation applies to 
Ukraine.  
  Since independence in 1991, Ukraine has always scored highly on a scale 
of corruption of Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. At 
the international political level, fighting corruption has often entailed the sign-
ing of relevant protocols. Thus, Ukraine has developed a complex legal frame-
work providing for the application of anti-corruption measures. For example, 
when Ukraine ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and 
adopted its measures on the 31st October 2003, it accepted the following obli-
gations: to support the introduction and development of initiatives designed to 
target corruption; to support international collaboration intended to challenge 
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corruption (including technical facilitation, collaboration and assistance in 
anti-money laundering procedures); and to facilitate honesty, responsibility 
and transparency in managing its state, budget and assets.  
 These procedures may be considered as a breakthrough; providing an array 
of resources to tackle corruption. However, the efficient execution of these 
measures by the state remains unmonitored, making them in effect little more 
than diplomatic signposts indicating compliance without detailing any suc-
cessful outcomes. Indeed, the implementation of anti-corruption directives has 
proved to be largely ineffective, and not only in Ukraine. 
 UNCAC is considered to be a first global legally binding anticorruption 
instrument. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) notes that the most challenging aspect to 
the implementation of this convention is the lack of “an effective follow-up 
monitoring mechanism” (p.189). Once countries such as Ukraine adopt the 
provisions of the UNCAC as national law, it has proved extremely difficult to 
put them into effect (ibid.). Despite the fact that there is presently no evidence 
that such countries that have adopted the UNCAC have deployed their anti-
corruption measures efficiently, the importance of their diplomatic signifi-
cance should not be underestimated. Their very recognition is an acknowl-
edgement of the importance of anti-corruption reform movements: a point of 
departure.  
 In 2014, fighting domestic corruption was highlighted as being a major 
priority for Ukraine. In fact, the demonstration of effective anti-corruption in-
itiatives has now become a prerequisite to obtaining political and especially 
financial support from western donors whose perception of the situation in 
Ukraine is crucial. For example, a Dutch referendum on the EU-associate 
agreement failed because of the Dutch perception of Ukraine being a corrupt 
country.  
 Though there is a degree of international unity concerning the importance 
of fighting domestic corruption, the definition of what qualifies as such is 
vague. “Integrity” (or the lack of it) is often seen as being a vital element of 
the definition but it is badly demarcated. For the purpose of our research this 
is not necessarily a problem as we are not dealing here with demarcations of 
basic concepts but with the perceptions of citizens. 
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 It is important to understand corruption and the perception of corruption as 
being cultural phenomena because these are related to the ways societies un-
derstand its rules and compliance with those rules (Melgar et al., 2010). Peo-
ple’s perception of corruption depends on their “values and moral views” 
(ibid.). Some may never have paid a bribe in their lifetime, but are aware nev-
ertheless, that others are engaged in corruption, a situation that has the poten-
tial to make them regard their entire society as being corrupt.  
 Why then is it important to study corruption perception? A short answer 
would be that it directly affects the issue of trust. Melgar et al., (2010) point 
out that “high levels of corruption perception could have more devastating 
effects than corruption itself; it generates a ‘culture of distrust’ towards some 
institutions and may create a cultural tradition of gift giving and hence, raising 
corruption”. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) develops this notion further in discussing 
the importance of the cultural context in implementing anti-corruption 
measures.  
 ‘Perception’ is not necessarily a vague concept here. There are a number 
of internationally recognised indicators of corruption which attempt to capture 
statistically the experience of people (households and business communities). 
Some well-known surveys are: Global Corruption Barometer, the Global 
Competitiveness Report, the International Country Risk Guide and the World 
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator for the Control of Corruption. These 
analyse representative population samples and also the perception of business-
men and experts on corruption: their findings are used widely in developing 
policy initiatives, hence, even if subjective, perception matters. 
 The analysis of cultural settings is often considered essential to provide an 
estimate of the scale of corruption in a country. Investigating the endemic na-
ture of corruption among the elite in Ukraine is one way to begin to understand 
such cultural settings. The ‘elite’ of Ukraine includes political, military, and 
public service representatives. Illegal profits gained from corrupt exchanges 
often depends on hierarchical positions within the state, proximity to state 
budget control and/or legislative power.  
 It is difficult to find any sphere of life in Ukraine that is not affected by 
corruption. Schools, hospitals, ministries, and both state and privately owned 
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factories have all been implicated in corruption scandals. Below we have se-
lected some recent examples investigated post 2014. 
 Various cases have provoked different degrees of concern. In 2017 the case 
of the State Enterprise (SE) Lviv Armor Vehicle Factory, that after a tender 
won the supply of new В-46-6 engines to the Armored Command Center 
(ACC) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, was a particularly striking example 
arising from the military conflict in the east of the country (NABU, 2017). 
According to retrieved documents “LAVF bought engines from Limited lia-
bility company (LLC) Bullet Line and supplied them to the ACC of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine for 28.560.000 UAH2”. Detectives of the National Anti-
Corruption Bureau (NABU) investigated the deal and found that “the engines 
were supplied by a third party without any documents. The contracts with LLC 
were in fact fictitious”. The investigation also revealed that “the supplied en-
gines had been sold to enterprises in the domestic market as surplus assets of 
the Ministry of Defense”. Such effective stealing from the armed forces was 
considered by the Ukrainian media at the time as being a new low for the 
Ukrainian ‘elite’.  
 The illegal extraction of amber in Western Ukraine, facilitated by Members 
of Parliament, is an example of a different cultural context of corruption: that 
of natural resources (NABU, 2017). The illegal extraction of amber in West-
ern Ukraine has been reported by the Ukrainian media over a long period 
(Fakty, 2016; Lebed, 2015). Lebed (2015) reports that depending on the na-
tion’s presidency, the official policy against illegal extraction differed signif-
icantly. For example, in the time of President Kuchma the illegal extraction of 
amber was in effect a state enterprise, but during the Yushchenko regime it 
became directly exploited by criminals. Lebed (2015) also states that follow-
ing a moratorium on illegal amber extraction the documentation concerning 
the activity and possible state involvement in it was intentionally chaotic, 
making any investigation virtually impossible. In a similar way Ukrainian of-
ficials were implicated in the “organisation of a criminal scheme of purchase 
of ilmenite, routine, zirconium and salmonite concentrates extracted at low 
prices” (NABU, 2017).  
                                                          
2  As of 13 February 2019, 28.560.000 UAH is approximately 935.000 Euro. 
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 The first two decades of Ukrainian independence created a fruitful ground 
for the elite to abuse their power without being subject to sanctions, the con-
sequent loss of public trust is therefore hardly surprising, and had serious con-
sequences. Johnson (2014) studied the nature of political trust following dem-
ocratic reforms in Poland and Ukraine, and found that in Ukraine there exists 
a negative association between support for democracy and trust in political 
institutions. People believe in democracy but they do not trust the political 
elite. 
 This chapter presents the results of a five year corruption perception survey 
undertaken in the city of Kharkiv in order to critically address the structural 
factors and models with which to assess the level of corruption in Ukraine. 
We aim to facilitate ongoing discussion regarding effective anti-corruption 
reforms.  
 
 
Ukraine and the fight against domestic corruption 
 
The Maidan Revolt engendered a real hope that endemic corruption in Ukrain-
ian politics and society would be tackled seriously. Such a hope was, however, 
soon disappointed. Freedom House (2017) reported that since the revolution 
of 2014, anti-corruption reforms had not progressed according to the expecta-
tion of local reformers and the international community. “Corruption still per-
meates the state, and it is clear that the political will at the top of the govern-
ment has not been sufficient to dismantle the old system” (Ibid.). The Ukrain-
ian public still rated corruption as the nation’s most serious problem. 44% of 
people interviewed by the Fund for Democratic Initiatives (2017) considered 
corruption as its most serious problem, while 90% believed that corruption 
was widespread. In the same study the most corrupt institutions were identi-
fied as being the courts, the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament of Ukraine), the 
Prosecutor’s Office, and the Government. Only the church and NGOs received 
higher ratings in terms of trust (ibid.). For many ordinary Ukrainians, it is 
precisely the political will to address and tackle corruption that is lacking. A 
factor that makes the fight against corruption ever more difficult is the contin-
uing armed conflict in the east of the country and the consequent increasing 
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number of cases of corruption related to that conflict (Markovska and Ser-
dyuk, 2018).  
 Among significant changes identified by the Freedom House in 2017 was 
the initiative of Ukrainian civil society groups, backed by international organ-
isations or governments (The United States, the European Union, and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund), in effecting structural changes to accommodate 
new organisations to control corruption. For example, in 2015 the Ukrainian 
government established the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), an in-
dependent law enforcement organisation with significant powers to investi-
gate high level corruption. This body works in conjunction with the Special-
ised Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office (SAPO) which has powers to prose-
cute upper level criminality. However, as Markovska and Van Duyne (2019) 
note “the data available (or lack of it) thus far does not show that their inte-
grated approach is efficient and effective”. Nevertheless, the budget of NABU 
has been increased from 486,6 mln Hrv in 2016 to 857 mln Hrv in 2018, and 
as of 31st March 2018 it has secured 19 convictions. For some this is consid-
ered to be a success, but others raise the issue of undue political influence to 
explain the relatively small number of successful prosecutions. This may point 
to the activity of a clandestine opposition against an intensive anti-corruption 
policy at a higher level. Indeed, the immediate future will be crucial for the 
ability of NABU to establish its credibility and independent investigative au-
thority. 
 Over the past four years the Ukrainian parliament has “passed wide-rang-
ing judicial reforms, including important constitutional changes to establish a 
comprehensive anti-corruption framework modelled on EU best practices” 
(Freedom House, 2017). The conclusion drawn by Freedom House (2017) was 
that as “long as Ukraine’s international partners remain clear about the funda-
mental principles that will lead to success, and continue to back change with 
both short-term and long-term incentives, the country will have no choice but 
to press ahead with major reforms”. The question remains as to how realistic 
is it to suggest that the progress against Ukrainian domestic corruption will in 
fact continue even when the international partners withdraw from Ukraine?  
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 For an answer to this question we refer to the study conducted by Mungiu-
Pippidi (2015) who analysed different understandings of the causal mecha-
nisms of corruption, and the policy initiatives employed in their suppression. 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) argues that there are at least three distinct models used 
to explain the rationale behind corruption control initiatives: 
1. structural factors that are facilitated by the external events (for example 
financial crises or war);  
2. institutional legal instruments and the establishment of a legal framework 
to fight corruption;  
3. corruption control as one element in a wide spectrum of economic reforms.  
 
In order to understand the ‘what works agenda’, we need to go beyond at-
tempts at control and look at the social, political and geographical setting of a 
particular country that facilitates corruption (Ibid.), consequently, Mungiu-
Pippidi (2015) elaborates on structural factors such as size of population, eth-
nic diversity, the existence of a principle of ethic universalism (equality before 
the law) and regional variation in living conditions and rates of modernisation 
(including political modernisation). Her purpose is to determine whether de-
veloping countries can impose “a superstructure of rational and legal admin-
istration” (p.97) in order to create an environment conducive to good govern-
ance and the application of the measures demanded by anti-corruption reform. 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) identifies a problem in the process of modernisation 
enforced from above that has the potential to create significant discord be-
tween official norms, and how society operates (ibid.). By ratifying the UN-
CAC, Ukraine has accepted the role assigned to it by the international com-
munity and continued to co-operate in the development of comprehensive in-
stitutional legal instruments (one of the three rationales behind corruption con-
trol mentioned above). However, this does not necessarily mean that “govern-
ment and society are in some state of transition to modernity” implying there-
fore different cultural norms (ibid.:97). In this chapter we understand the ‘tran-
sition to modernity’ as being a move to principles of good governance, ac-
countability and transparency. Many countries in the world have been ‘mod-
ernised’ but only a selected few have managed to implement accountability 
and transparency in standards of governance. 
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 What then can be said of the impact of international anti-corruption initia-
tives? In response, Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) investigated institutional interven-
tions to control corruption arguing that “the bivariate regressions show that 
neither of the tested anti-corruption interventions has a positive significant ef-
fect on control of corruption. The presence of an anti-corruption agency is 
even associated with a deterioration in the control of corruption” (p. 106). The 
researcher concedes that in order to study any individual country, country-
specific information must be tested to understand the actual effectiveness of 
its relevant measures. That is why an understanding of the national context of 
Ukraine is very important in assessing the success of its anti-corruption 
measures.  
 In this chapter we discuss the results of a 5-year survey beginning in 2013 
and concurrent with an anti-corruption movement that led to political unrest 
against the background of military conflict in the east of the country. In an 
attempt to understand the sentiment of the citizens of Kharkiv prior to, during 
and in the aftermath of a series of anti-corruption measures that were sup-
ported by both local enthusiasts and international donors. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Since December 2013, five annual surveys have been conducted in Kharkiv 
in eastern Ukraine. The first survey was conducted in December 2013, the 
second in October 2014, and repeated annually in October 2015, 2016 and 
2017. Each survey was conducted over a three-day period. In the 2017 survey, 
662 respondents aged 16 and above were interviewed. The survey was con-
ducted as part of the “Program for ensuring public safety and order in the ter-
ritory of the Kharkiv Region for 2016-2017” implemented by the Kharkiv Na-
tional University of Internal Affairs. To gather data, selected members of the 
general public were interviewed face-to-face for 10-15 minutes by 36 inter-
viewers from the University of Internal Affairs using a structured paper ques-
tionnaire.  
 A quota sampling method was used to select respondents by demographics 
(sex, age) and geographical characteristics (district of residence in the city). 
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The selected cohort was selected to be representative of the general population 
of Kharkiv (population 1.451.377 as of 01-10-2017) according to age, sex and 
place of residence. The measurement errors at a 95% confidence limit were 
calculated as being: for indicators approaching 50% ± 3,94%; for indicators 
approaching 25% ± 3,4%; for indicators approaching 10% ± 2,36%; for indi-
cators approaching 5% ± 1,71%.  
 The questionnaire includes 19 items measured by Likert scale and three 
sets of questions:  
1.  Perception of corruption (seriousness of the problem of corruption, level 
of corruption, assessment of the effect of corruption, readiness of respond-
ents themselves to participate in corrupt practices, the ‘image’ of corrup-
tion that respondents create for themselves, personal “policy” towards 
bribery, ways to eliminate corruption);  
2.  Experience of corruption (% of Kharkiv residents who have personally ex-
perienced corruption during the contacts with 19 types of the official insti-
tutions, “bribes on demand”, voluntary offer of bribes, use of personal con-
nections, official complaint against corruption);  
3.  Social and demographic characteristics of participants (sex, age, education, 
income, district of residence).  
SPSS (v 22.0) was used in statistical analysis.  
 
 
Findings 
 
In this chapter we discuss selected questions that deal with the public percep-
tion of corruption; in particular, just how do people perceive corruption, and 
why does this matter?  
 In order to understand the participants’ perception of the seriousness of 
corruption, they were asked to answer the following question, “In your opin-
ion, how serious is the problem of corruption in Ukraine?”. Table 1 below 
shows their responses to this question starting 2013 onwards. In 2017, 65% of 
respondents believed that corruption was a serious problem in Ukraine. Inter-
estingly, in comparison with 2013, by 2017 the number of people who held 
corruption to be a very serious problem was lower. Is it the case that the anti-
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corruption reforms in post-Maidan Ukraine started to work, or is it because 
the other social and political issues become more prominent? 
 
Table 1:  
How serious is the problem of corruption in Ukraine? 
 2013 
% 
2014 
% 
2015 
% 
2016 
% 
2017 
% 
Mean 
Very serious 45 53 35 39 25 39 
Serious  35 30 34 32 40 34 
Difficult to answer 17 13 20 17 24 18 
Not serious  3 2 6 8 8 5 
Absolutely not serious 0 2 4 4 2 2 
100% = N 492 581 533 1016 622 - 
Index* 0,6 0,65 0,45 0,46 0,38 - 
*Index calculated by recoding responses into digital values: Very serious = +1; Seri-
ous = +0,5; Difficult to answer = 0; Not serious = -0,5; Absolutely not serious = -1. 
Index varies from +1 to - 1. Please note that ‘difficult to answer’ is important because 
it can change our mean (and index) by increasing the general number of respondents 
(our denominator). So this category must be included in the table, “difficult to answer” 
was therefore coded as “missing value” and excluded from further analysis. 
 
A more visual means of understanding the trend over the last five years is by 
analysing the index calculated according to the responses: here +1 means the 
problem is “very serious” and -1 means that the problem is “not serious at all”. 
We identify two discernible groups: one representing those who believe in the 
seriousness of corruption as a social issue and a smaller group who does not 
think there is a serious problem. It is interesting to observe that over the five 
years of the study there was a fluctuation in the number of respondents choos-
ing not to give a definitive answer. It is this group of respondents that is of 
major interest to us. There are several ways to interpret the ‘difficult to an-
swer’ entry. Some researchers argue that often the ‘difficult to answer’ option 
represents a lazy way of responding to a questionnaire (Krosnick and Presser, 
2010). By contrast, we suggest that this is in fact an important indicator of 
public difficulty make a definitive choice. According to us, the increasing 
number of respondents choosing the ‘difficult to answer’ option might point 
to the emergence of new concerns in Ukrainian society where the perception 
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of the seriousness of corruption is overshadowed by concerns about the mili-
tary conflict on the one hand, and the worsening economic situation of ordi-
nary citizens on the other. In a survey of the general public undertaken in 2018, 
the Fund of the Democratic Initiatives (FDI, 2018) reported that 36% of re-
spondents assessed life in Ukraine as being difficult, and 46% as being un-
bearable.  
 Graph 1 below represents responses to the question “How would you rate 
the level of corruption in Ukraine and in the city of Kharkiv?” Results have 
been recoded into the index from 0 to 1, where 0 is “very low level of corrup-
tion” and 1 is “very high level of corruption”. Index calculated by recoding 
answers to digital values: Very high = 1; Higher than average = 0,75; Average 
= 0,5; Lower than average = 0,25; Very low = 0. 
 
Graph 1.  
“How would you rate the level of corruption  
in Ukraine and Kharkiv?”* 
 
*The index estimate varies from 0 – very low level to 1 – very high level 
 
We observe that normally the respondents from Kharkiv rated the issue of 
corruption as being worse for Ukraine than for their home city of Kharkiv; 
emphasising the corrupting influence if the outsiders rather than that of their 
fellow Kharkiv citizens. 
 Question 3 was designed to measure changes in perception of the level of 
corruption over the last 12 months by asking: “In your opinion, has the level 
of corruption changed in the last 12 months?” 
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Table 2. 
Has the level of corruption changed in the last 12 months (%) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Increased a lot 17 17 11 9 12 
Increased a little 27 19 17 19 19 
Has not changed 46 46 49 43 48 
Decreased a little 4 10 12 16 13 
Decreased a lot 1 1 3 4 2 
Difficult to answer 5 7 8 10 6 
100% = N 492 581 533 1016 622 
Index* 0,29 0,22 0,11 0,07 0,13 
*Index calculated by recoding answers to digital values: Increased a lot = +1; In-
creased a little = +0,5; Has not changed = 0; Decreased a little = -0,5; Decreased a lot 
= -1; Difficult to answer = missing value. Index varies from +1 to -1. 
 
It is interesting to note that in 2017 more respondents believed that corruption 
had increased (31% in total) whereas about 48% of respondents believe that 
the level of corruption had not changed.  
 In order to quantify the personal understanding of the negative effect of 
corruption, question 5 asked, “In your opinion, is corruption bad for the state 
and citizens in general or bad for you personally?” 
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Table 3. 
Is corruption bad for citizens and state or bad for you personally? 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 Citi-
zen 
% 
Per-
son 
% 
Cit-
izen 
% 
Per-
son 
% 
Cit-
izen 
% 
Per-
son 
% 
Citi-
zen 
% 
Per-
son 
% 
Citi-
zen 
% 
Per-
son 
% 
Yes, negative 
impact 
57 40 68 56 60 46 60 42 51 38 
Rather negative 
impact 
37 42 24 19 24 26 25 26 34 37 
Rather no nega-
tive impact 
4 10 3 13 8 15 5 12 8 14 
No impact 1 5 2 9 4 9 4 11 3 7 
Difficult to an-
swer 
2 4 4 4 4 4 5 9 3 4 
100% = N 492 492 581 581 533 533 1016 1016 622 622 
Index* 0,7 0,4 0,8 0,5 0,65 0,4 0,7 0,4 0,6 0,41 
*Index calculated by recoding answers to digital values: Yes, negative impact = +1; 
Rather negative impact = +0,5; Rather no = -0,5; No impact = -1; Difficult to answer 
= 0. Index varies from +1 to -1. 
 
Table 3 shows that in general, respondents believed that corruption was bad 
for all citizens and the state. However, with regard to themselves, they rated 
the seriousness of the impact of corruption across the years as being univer-
sally lower.  
 In order to quantify the readiness of respondents themselves to participate 
in corrupt practices, question 5 asked “In your opinion, can you justify bribery, 
unofficial services or presents, if it is important to you in solving a certain 
problem?” 
 Our Graph 2 reveals that in 2014 only 16% of respondents categorically 
objected to corrupt practices, but this proportion increased to 31% by 2017. 
However, more than half of respondents (60%) were prepared to justify cor-
ruption depending on the situation. This we believe is due to the peculiar fea-
ture of the cultural context of Ukraine. 
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Graph 2. 
 Can corruption be justified?  
 
 
In order to understand the ‘image’ of corruption that respondents create for 
themselves we asked “In your opinion, what does corruption mean for people 
in society and for yourself?” Respondents were asked to select 4 answers out 
of a possible 8. 
 According to Graph 3, 40% of respondents believed in the overall negative 
influence of corruption and expressed an awareness that corruption has a dev-
astating impact on society and state institutions. However, more than a third 
(39%) indicated that corruption was nevertheless “a quick way to solve com-
plex problems without bureaucracy and red tape.” Both opinions it seems 
could be held by the same respondent. This is illustrated by a fifth of respond-
ents agreeing with the old saying “if you don’t oil, you don’t move” indicating 
that corruption is still accepted in certain situations. For example, informally 
settling a parking fine by negotiating and bribing the police. While evidently 
understanding the negative impact of corruption, the respondents revealed a 
surprising ambivalence to the issue. 
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Graph 3.  
Perception of corruption  
(The image of corruption that respondents create for themselves) 
 
 
In order to understand personal conduct in relation to bribery we posed the 
further question: “What is your personal “policy” towards bribery?” of which 
the results are summarised in Graph 4.  
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Graph 4.  
Personal “policy” towards bribery. 
 
 
More than a third of respondents personally justified bribery, when faced with 
a hopeless situation (from their point of view) or where they “very much 
needed a result.” A quarter believed that some corruption could be avoided. 
However, less than a third of respondents refused participation in corrupt prac-
tices and believed that bribes should never be given in any circumstances. 
 It is interesting to observe that around 6% of people claimed to be com-
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offer a bribe has decreased over the same period. Overall, the respondents tend 
to be increasingly tolerant towards corruption. 
 Our next question asked “What possible steps might be undertaken to elim-
inate corruption”? 
 
Graph 5.  
Possible ways to eliminate corruption
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Kharkiv respondents tend to believe that corruption is practically impossible 
to supress (36% in 2017, 42% in 2016 and 36% in 2015) and a third of re-
spondents believe that the authorities lack any real will to tackle corruption.  
The survey also investigated respondents’ personal experience of corrup-
tion. In 2017 as compared with 2016, less people reported that they had been 
solicited for a bribe though more reported that they had offered a bribe volun-
tarily. Surprisingly however, the FDU (2018) national survey reported that 
60% of Ukrainians prioritised the implementation of anti-corruption reforms.  
 
Graph 6.  
Personal experience of corruption  
% of Kharkiv residents who have personally experienced corruption 
 
Against the background of a general reduction in the experience of “bribes on 
demand”, there was a slight increase in the voluntary offer of bribes and a 
large increase in the use of personal connections. This is important, because it 
implies that an ‘enabling network’ of like-minded people of questionable in-
tegrity exists, signalling a hidden economy of corrupt exchange, which implies 
59
62
43 43
30
22 24
31
28 30
19
15 25
29
39
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
extortion of bribes (bribes on demand)
voluntary bribes
‘string-pulling’ ( use of connections)
331 
 
all previously noted forms of corruption, but one which employs them with 
greater caution. 
 The following graph shows the percentage of respondents who had person-
ally experienced corruption and made an official complaint against it. 
 
Graph 7. 
Did you make an official complain about corruption? (“Yes”, %) 
 
 
It will be noticed that the percentage of those who have complained of corrup-
tion has increased: from 16% to 30% between 2016 and 2017, showing that 
there are now a growing number of Ukrainians who are less tolerant to corrupt 
practices. Our previous two graphs provide us with some interesting material 
for consideration. While 39% of our respondents had themselves offered 
bribes on a voluntary basis, 30% of respondents had complained officially 
about corruption! While intolerance of corruption is growing, the same can be 
said of a pragmatic personal tolerance of it. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
The 2017 Kharkiv survey highlighted significant ambiguity in public attitudes 
towards corruption. As stated above we have observed a growing intolerance 
of corrupt conduct while also accepting it as part of daily life. Mungiu-Pippidi 
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(2015) notes that in the context of developing countries, as in our case, this 
ambivalent attitude towards corruption, challenges the assumption of Western 
anti-corruption donors that corruption is a deviation from the rule of law and 
seeks to impose ‘zero-tolerance’ of it. We can perhaps conclude that ‘pathol-
ogising’ corruption has not yet been effective in Ukraine, and may not neces-
sarily be the most expedient way to cure this malaise. 
 A second significant observation is that of a lack of political will in tackling 
corrupt practices. This issue is evidently connected with the ambiguity to-
wards corruption noted above and the seeming acceptance of it by a third of 
our respondents. In 2017, 36% of Kharkiv respondents believed that it is im-
possible to tackle corruption. This is in agreement with a 2017 national survey 
that revealed 90% of Ukrainians as believing corruption to be widespread 
(FDI, 2017). The problem of corruption in transitional societies is often asso-
ciated with political power. Unfortunately, up to the present donors have at-
tempted to counter corruption through the encouragement of technical exper-
tise and training (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). The danger with this approach in 
Ukraine is that the task of controlling the implementation of an anti-corruption 
policy is often in the charge of a political elite which is corrupt and controls 
access to the state resources. Since 2014 Ukraine has made substantial pro-
gress in founding and developing independent institutions to investigate cor-
ruption cases and prosecute guilty parties even if often actively opposed by. 
But even then it was an uphill struggle achieved because donors threatened to 
withdraw funding. 
 The third topic that deserves further study is that of the growth in voluntary 
bribes being offered by members of the general public in exchange for favour-
able official decisions and the use of informal links and social connections to 
influence that decision making. This phenomenon accords with the ‘blat sys-
tem’ as described by Ledeneva (2018) where corrupt practices are “associated 
with sociability, i.e. the use of personal networks, but also serve an instrumen-
tal purpose in gaining influence or accessing limited resources” (Ledeneva, 
2018). In Soviet times the term was used to describe mutual assistance in gain-
ing goods or services that were in short supply (and where financial payment 
was often not required). Voluntarily offered bribes in Ukraine are similarly 
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likely to occur concerning obtaining a favourable decision from service pro-
viders. For example, extractors of amber from the fields of the western 
Ukraine used to offer bribes to the local police to keep their illegal extraction 
from the notice of the authorities (Lebed, 2015). Our 2017 Kharkiv study sug-
gests that in a time of political instability and conflict, the employment of so-
cial connections and informal links could be seen as beneficial and less blame-
worthy. It is also less likely to be investigated by the new anti-corruption or-
ganisations if any exchange is classified as ‘security cleared and pre-ar-
ranged’, no matter how that exchange was achieved. 
 Regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives Kaufmann (1997) 
argues that they must relate to available information, decisive leadership and 
collective action. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) notes that while many Western do-
nors understand the importance of civil society and the media in creating the 
social climate necessary to tackle corruption, not many understand the im-
portance of collective action. Successful anti-corruption projects must be 
multi-dimensional and involve a broad range of actors (ibid.).  
 In 2017 Kharkiv residents no longer described corruption as the most chal-
lenging issue faced by country. There are many factors that may have influ-
enced this change. Among them are: the worsening economic situation for 
ordinary Ukrainians and the continuing military conflict in the east of the 
country. The priority for most ordinary people is simply to survive financially 
in this worsening economic and political situation. Many ordinary people view 
the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures with more than a pinch of scep-
ticism. On a local level respondents believe that the level of corruption in the 
city of Kharkiv is stable. One in five believes that corruption does not impact 
on their daily lives (see Table 3). A prevalent sentiment is that although cor-
ruption is bad it can be good for you personally. Consequently, in comparison 
with the 2016 survey by 2017 more respondents were willing to justify corrupt 
actions. At the same time, however, respondents increasingly argue categori-
cally against corruption in all its aspects. We believe therefore that it is possi-
ble to argue that we are observing a degree of ‘inner polarisation’ indicated by 
the evident internal ambiguity in these views. On the one hand, a rejection of 
corruption in principle while on the other hand, tolerating it in personal prac-
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tice. Those who complain about corruption often view themselves as the ‘pris-
oners’ of the phenomenon having very little ability to challenge the system in 
which they are forced to function.  
 Anti-corruption initiatives in Ukraine have in the past targeted specific in-
dividuals, and have consequently failed to challenge the institutional frame-
work or the systems of governance within which those individuals operate. In 
addition, those in power have failed to present a good example of transparent 
governance and personal probity. In 2016 in an attempt to tackle corruption 
and placate western donors, specifically the International Monetary Fund, the 
government of Ukraine “launched the wealth database for legislators and civil 
servants” (Prentice, 2018). About one million civil servants had to complete 
an on-line e-declaration. As a result of the information being made public or-
dinary citizens have learned of the luxurious life style of many politicians and 
senior civil servants. Nevertheless, it is telling that the National Agency on 
Corruption Prevention that is supposed to check the e-declaration data, has 
never really been fully operational (ibid.). This half-baked implementation ex-
plains the remaining and substantial degree of scepticism on the part of the 
general public. It seems that although information on corrupt officials is in-
creasingly available, systemic concrete actions to end corruption have not yet 
started. 
 In such a context one can see why voluntary bribe offering becomes a 
norm: the administrative structure remains the same and most newly appointed 
officials tend to operate under the same norm. To simply survive it becomes 
necessary to ‘play the system’; to offer a bribe when necessary.  
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